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Abstract: 
On the international scene, the interest for a (partially) closed nuclear fuel cycle is continuously 
increasing. As nuclear power will maintain (and in some areas further grow into) a crucial role 
in the energy production, the reprocessing of nuclear fuel is also (re)gaining interest. While 
waiting for the generation IV nuclear energy systems which are foreseen to be designed also to 
decrease the risk of diversion of weapons-usable materials, the reprocessing of spent fuel using 
PUREX or UREX processes will be in demand either to recover energy valuable products such 
as uranium and plutonium or to reduce the volume of highly radioactive waste. Because of their 
complexity and the presence of bulk quantities of sensitive nuclear material, reprocessing plants 
require strict and continuous safeguards activities by international bodies such as the IAEA or 
supranational organizations such as Euratom. In support of both these organizations, the JRC 
has developed a software package allowing enhanced process monitoring for nuclear materials 
in solutions present in reprocessing installations. This tool has been in use for several years at 
the French commercial reprocessing plant in La Hague and is being implemented at the THORP 
plant at Sellafield. It is also used for training and supporting activities in the Rokkasho facility 
in Japan. This paper describes the functionalities of this tool, the current developments and the 
potential integrations with complementary information to lead to an efficient product for near 
real time accountancy for safeguards purposes. 
 
Introduction: 
Amongst the plants of the nuclear industry, some are particularly safeguards sensitive, the fuel 
fabrication plants, the enrichment plants and the fuel reprocessing facilities. In those plants, 
some nuclear material (NM, mainly U and Pu) is present in considerable amounts as liquid, gas 
or powder form. Some Pu containing materials are typically considered to be ‘direct use 
material’. Such installations have a particular safeguards sensitivity - consequently the JRC is 
focusing on the development of relevant technologies for the inspectorate. 
The reprocessing plants combine different characteristics which make them particularly 
“challenging” for the safeguards activities. As soon as the spent fuel assembly is chopped, the 
nuclear material does not exist anymore in item form. Large bulks of highly radioactive 
solutions are processed to recover uranium, usually as uranyl nitrate liquors and plutonium, first 
as plutonium nitrate solution and then as plutonium dioxide powders. 
In such plants, only the combination of the measurement and follow-up of itemized NM with a 
reliable estimate of the U and Pu content in process liquors performed by precise sample 
analyses, volume and weight determination allows the verification of the NM inventory with 
sufficient accuracy. 
In support to safeguards inspectors, software tools have been developed and implemented that 
simplify the selection and analysis of relevant events in the chemical processing parts of the 
facilities, thus optimizing the inspection time and cost. Analytical capacities such as the on-site 
laboratories (OSLs) have been implemented in order to provide independent and fast 
measurements of U/Pu concentration and isotopic composition. 
This paper describes the existing tools and proposed development for the future integration of 
various tools in a more global instrument (SAT, Safeguards Analysis Tool). Gathering most of 
the relevant information, SAT provides higher level analysis and is expected to provide the 
inspectors with a powerful decision making tool for the physical verification activities. 
 
Existing tools and new modules: 
Inspector needs: 
Reprocessing plants are complex bulk facilities dealing with large amounts of nuclear material 
that is present just after the dissolution in liquid form. For a facility having a nominal 
throughput of 800 metric tons of heavy metal per year, it can be estimated that the quantity of 
plutonium being daily processed is about 30 kilograms. In the mid eighties, Near Real Time 
Accountancy (NRTA) was introduced as a new methodology for in-process inventory 
verification and timely detection of anomalies in bulk handling facilities. It was demonstrated 
that NRTA is superior to conventional accountancy for both abrupt and protracted losses [1]. In 
the early nineties NRTA became also the IAEA safeguards approach for reprocessing plants [2]. 
 
Historian – DAI package: 
NRTA verification starts with the measurements of volume and density of solutions and the 
monitoring of their transfer through accountancy tanks throughout the process. In order to do so 
in an effective and efficient way, the JRC-Ispra has developed a software: the Data Analysis and 
Interpretation tool or DAI [3, 4]. Raw volume and density relevant data are transferred from on 
line measuring instrumentation such as pressure transducers into a so-called historian database 
where, on the basis of some algorithms such as the dead-band exclusion and the “swinging 
door” data points are filtered out so that for the time periods during which the signal is constant 
only a few points are recorded to make sure that the system is still active. In the case of fast 
signal variations, data are recorded at a higher frequency to catch all potentially significant 
changes. So, all the data bringing useful information are stored and made available for the DAI 
kernel. 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 1: compression and DAI checks 
The software is parameterized according to plant processes in order to detect different events by 
recognizing the sequential functional behaviors with an accurate identification of their start and 
end. DAI is able to identify tank related activities such as filling, plateau, emptying. The 
software firstly checks the consistency of the events with the process design by verifying its 
completeness and conformity with the predefined sequence of functional behaviors. Secondly, it 
verifies whether the exchange/transferred nuclear material is coherent by cross correlating 
complementary behaviors: to the emptying of a tank should correspond the filling-up of the 
following one in the process. 
The DAI software allows to control that the volume of solution which “disappeared” from a tank 
“reappeared” in the filled one, any eventual “missing” material is checked on-line and a warning 
would be issued to the inspector in this case. By making use of the uranium and plutonium 
concentrations the mass balance can be calculated in near real time. 
For the back end of the facility, the DAI software also integrates the possibility of analyzing the 
weighing cycle of the filling-up of plutonium dioxide powder into containers. The analysis 
checks that the weighing procedure is strictly respected and nuclear material weight is recorded. 
If one of the checks fails, the program will flag the transfer in order to request special action 
from the inspectorate. 
The DAI software was installed and successfully tested at the reprocessing plants in La Hague. 
It has routinely been used for more than two years. After the positive conclusions of a feasibility 
study performed by JRC for the possible use of the DAI software at THORP in the UK, its 
implementation has been requested by DG TREN. 
The historian - DAI package is also being used by the IAEA at the Tokay reprocessing plant. It 
also served for the parameterization of the Agency solution monitoring system at RRP. 
The items leaving the chemical area are verified with neutron/gamma measurement stations. The 
integration of those is further discussed below. 
 
On-Site laboratories: 
More than a decade ago, only a hybrid K-edge densitometer was installed on each site of the two 
main commercial reprocessing plants in Europe for the determination of the U-Pu 
concentrations in liquors. These instruments were operated either by inspectors-analysts (IA) 
from JRC-ITU or by DG TREN inspectors to perform independent measurements of uranium 
and/or plutonium concentrations of process liquors. The inspectorate could then compare these 
results with the declarations of the operator. 
This “simple” set-up had a main drawback: no other independent measuring technique was 
present on-site in case of confirmed discrepancy between operator’s and inspector’s results. The 
concerned samples had then to be diluted and spiked by operator staff witnessed by an inspector 
before being evaporated to dryness and sent to the Institute for Transuranium Elements (ITU) in 
Germany to be analyzed after sample reconditioning and chemical separation of uranium and 
plutonium fractions. 
Not only the technical procedure was heavy and time consuming but also the transport 
organization was cumbersome. The transport costs were high and the time required to obtain 
results could exceed the inspectors’ needs by far. Following the philosophy to bring the analysts 
to the samples and not anymore the samples to the analysts, DG TREN charged ITU to 
implement two on-site laboratories. Their implementation has saved a very large number of Pu 
transports in Europe. 
Since their inauguration, in 1999 in Sellafield and in 2000 in La Hague, the laboratories have 
been manned by ITU inspectors-analysts [5, 6]. The JRC brings the experience gained in that 
field to the IAEA for the setting-up and the starting phase of the on-site laboratory implemented 
by the Agency at the Rokkasho reprocessing plant. 
The role of the on-site laboratories is of prime importance as they are the first place where the 
characterization of the dissolved spent fuel is done accurately on a timeliness basis. 
The analytical possibilities of the two laboratories enable a quasi in-line analysis of the samples 
and in case of discrepancy an independent technique is available. 
Accurate measurements are very rapidly available which is of a particular importance during the 
annual physical inventories performed by the inspectorate. An interface is envisaged to gather 
automatically the results into a database. Different transfer ways are possible: either by a 
dedicated connection to the inspector’s network (optical fiber or Ethernet cable) or by using the 
so-called mail-box. The latter consists of a hatch whose key is in possession of the IAs and gives 
access to a USB connection to which a key containing result files is connected for starting the 
data transfer process. A similar independent system is possible for the transfer of operator’s 
declarations. Such a transfer system allows to check the format of the data files and to time-
stamp the declarations even in the absence of the inspectors. The sender would receive in return 
a logfile acknowledging the transferred data files and errors which might have occurred. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
An additional module performing statistical analysis is needed to verify the operator’s 
declarations with the measurements performed by the OSLs in an automatic way. As the results 
from the DG TREN laboratories are available very quickly those can be used in a first step to 
check the process declarations. Although these have an uncertainty larger than the one 
associated to the accountancy declarations they allow to verify at an early stage the absence of a 
gross diversion and the respect of the declared reprocessing schedule. As soon as the more 
accurate accountancy declarations of the operator would be available the verification can be 
refined. 
Of course such a statistical module has to monitor also other parameters such as trends or the 
calibration of the detectors disseminated at the different points of interest in the plant. 
 
RADAR – CRISP package: 
Where DAI coupled to a data historian was especially designed to monitor volumes of solutions 
and their transfer, the development of RADAR (Remote Acquisition of Data And Review) [7, 8, 
9] was started about ten years ago by DG TREN to verify nuclear material in itemized form i.e. 
cans containing plutonium dioxide. 
RADAR was built in a modular way consisting of two main services (Portserver-Watchdog and 
Radarlog) which control Data Acquisition Modules (DAM). Each DAM controls a measurement 
device for data acquisition. The main measurement devices linked to RADAR are typically 
neutron coincidence counters, gamma detectors and ID readers. 
Fig. 2: principle of the hatch system - DMZ: DeMilitarized Zone 
The data produced by those devices are written into daily data files. The RADAR package also 
includes several data viewers for displaying those data in a graphical form. The parameters used 
to control the instruments are stored in setting files since they may contain information relevant 
for later data analysis. 
CRISP (Central RADAR Inspection Support Package) is the analysis kernel running on a 
database server for the RADAR system. It imports operator declarations in XML format and 
reads both the setting and data files produced by RADAR. Then it extracts the relevant 
information in several steps: 
1) The first step is an “event detection” phase. Here it finds the periods in time, when a 
measurement has occurred and the relevant measurement parameters are extracted (e.g. 
count rates).  
2) During the next step the “events” of sensors located at the same physical location are 
linked together to “super-events” using a time-window or sequence detection algorithm 
(example: the contents of a Pu-oxide container may be measured with a neutron 
coincidence counter and a gamma spectrometer and an ID reader may be present at the 
same location).  
3) In the next step calculations are performed with these “events” found in the previous 
step. Since these calculations sometimes make use of parameters used to operate the 
instrument (e.g. energy calibration), also these settings are made available. It is also 
possible to use CRISP in order to launch external programs for data evaluation (e.g. 
MGA – Multi Group Analysis – for Pu-isotopic determination in mass percent). This 
step can be repeated several times using different algorithms in different stages of 
analysis, each one building up on results obtained by the previous stage. 
4) In the last step the results are compared with the operator declarations and a report is 
produced, highlighting detected differences between the declared and the measured 
values.  
All these “events” and “super-events” generated during these steps are stored in a relational data 
base. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 3: RADAR/CRISP system 
Integration of the different tools: 
It has been proposed to integrate all the existing tools DAI, OSLs, RADAR/CRISP in a more 
global instrument, the Safeguards Analysis Tool (SAT). 
An OPCi layer is to be developed for RADAR and CRISP to increase their interoperability. Data 
written in daily files by RADAR would be available via the data historian and data collected by 
any OPC instrumentation could be evaluated by the CRISP analysis tool. 
The availability of the analysis results provided by the OSLs in a common relational database 
allows checking the operator’s reprocessing schedule and nuclear material declarations by 
implementing a statistical tool. Data such as isotopic composition is then made available for 
CRISP to improve the data analysis and access to the concentration results enables DAI to 
perform independent calculations of the nuclear material of the process liquors. 
Data, events and evaluations stored in a common database then provide a complete plant Near 
Real Time Accountancy system. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Conclusions: 
The Safeguards Analysis Tool (SAT) will require the integration of existing instruments such as 
the results from the on-site laboratories which provide independent measurements of the nuclear 
material, some modifications of others such as RADAR/CRISP to make use of the OPC 
technology and the development of a new statistical module for an automatic comparison with 
the operator declarations. In any case SAT does not interfere with any of the existing tools used 
by the inspectors to treat the information. 
The establishment of a successful SAT can only be achieved if all the software packages share 
the information collected by each of them and if all results are transferred into an extra database 
that is common as results info-base for the inspectorate. This allows increasing the effectiveness 
of on-site inspections as it would help the inspectors to focus on the main events and alarms 
throughout the process. 
It is envisaged to have encrypted and authenticated reports automatically created and transferred 
to headquarters in order to allow the inspectorate to enhance their efficiency, e.g. analyze at 
Fig. 4: Representation of the Safeguards Analysis Tool 
Blue arrows: OPC protocol; dashed lines: to be developed 
headquarters or plan and prepare missions and audits in advance. The transmission of data or 
reports would of course be subject to agreement with all parties involved. DG TREN and the 
JRC together have all the required competences to make the development of SAT a success in 
the interest of improved inspections. 
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i
 OLE (Object Linked Embedded) for Process Control, a standard in batch process industry 
